Yirsandy Rodríguez

Image courtesy of © David Frerker-Imagn Images There's a simple way to describe how Huascar Brazobán is succeeding in 2026: hitters are late, they can't find the barrel, and when they do make contact, it doesn't hurt. But that description doesn't do justice to what's actually happening mechanically, and it doesn't explain why this year's numbers look sustainable rather than like a hot stretch waiting to collapse. The story doesn't start with velocity. Brazobán throws his sinker at 95.9 mph, virtually unchanged from previous years. There's no new pitch. No grip adjustment, no revelation about a revamped approach. The Statcast data, however, tells a different story. Huascar Brazobán's Pitch That Changed Everything In 2025, Brazobán's changeup was functional. Hitters posted a .235 AVG and .331 wOBA against it — respectable numbers for a middle-innings reliever. In 2026, those figures have collapsed to .137 AVG and .192 wOBA, with an xwOBA of just .179. The whiff rate on the changeup sits at 32.3%, the hard-hit% dropped from 36.8% in 2025 to 15.8% in 2026, the SLG allowed is .196, and the pitch has generated a +5 Run Value on the season. Those are the numbers of a genuinely eliet pitch. Changeup Metric 2025 2026 AVG .235 .137 wOBA .331 .192 xwOBA .309 .179 xSLG .362 .278 Hard-Hit% 34.5% 22.2% Whiff% 23.9% 25.6% Barrel% 8.1% 2.2% Avg Exit Velocity 87.1 mph 83.5 mph ERA 3.57 2.18 xERA 3.96 2.75 Source: Baseball Savant The Sinker as Setup, Not Star The easy analytical mistake is to dismiss the sinker because it doesn't miss bats. Its whiff% is modest, and a 27.0% hard-hit rate isn't going to show up in any Statcast highlight. But the sinker isn't designed to strike anyone out; it's designed to set up the changeup. At 95.9 mph, the sinker forces hitters to respect the inner-lower portion of the zone. It shapes their mechanics. It demands a short, explosive swing toward that quadrant. Then, the changeup arrives — out of nearly the same tunnel, at 90.5 mph — with a movement profile that stays indistinguishable for most of its flight path. The velocity gap isn't dramatic, just five miles per hour. But both pitches share the same visual corridor before separating late, and that's where the damage gets done. Savant's Bat Tracking tab makes the strongest case that this improvement is real. Against his changeup in 2026, hitters are generating an elevated rate of late swings. The "Under" contact rate sits at just 3%, meaning almost no one is getting to the ball with the barrel in a good position. On the sinker, 72% of contact is "lined up," though it hardly results in real damage, because the timing was already compromised before the swing even started. The 2026 percentile rankings confirm it from another direction: 98th in Hard-Hit%, 99th in GB%, 92nd in xERA, 99th in Average EV, 98th in Barrel%. Five independent metrics pointing the same way. The one outlier is the strikeout rate, sitting at the 31st percentile — which fits the profile perfectly. Brazobán isn't a strikeout pitcher. He's a controlled-contact pitcher, and when multiple measurement systems converge on the same diagnosis, it usually isn't a fluke. Why This Matters for the Mets Carlos Mendoza has deployed him as an opener in high-leverage situations, sending him out against the top of opposing lineups before the game has a chance to develop. That makes sense: his peak value is concentrated in the first nine or twelve batters he faces, when the sinker-changeup combination is still an unknown for the other dugout. The real test comes in August and September, when teams will have more video. But a 2.2% Barrel rate and a 2.75 xERA aren't numbers that self-correct. Brazobán isn't on a run. He's in the best stretch of his career, with the data to back it up. View full article

Image courtesy of © David Frerker-Imagn Images When the New York Mets brought in Marcus Semien, the expectation was never that he would carry the offense by himself. They also didn't need him to immediately replicate his MVP-caliber seasons. What they wanted was stability: a hitter capable of controlling the strike zone, producing quality contact, and delivering the consistency that has defined much of his career. For the first five weeks of the season, that version of Semien seemed nowhere to be found. His .218/.291/.257 slash line and 64 wRC+ through his first 34 games ranked among the least productive performances from any regular in the Mets' lineup. More concerning was the near-complete disappearance of his power. For a hitter who has built much of his value on a combination of solid contact and extra-base production, a .291 slugging percentage inevitably raised questions about whether age-related decline was beginning to surface. A deeper look at his last 31 games, however, tells a very different story. Marcus Semien's Results Are Finally Catching Up to the Process On the surface, the improvement is easy to spot. Period PA AVG SLG wOBA xBA xSLG xwOBA First 34 games 121 .218 .291 .257 .232 .363 .289 Last 31 games 136 .232 .424 .306 .292 .497 .357 His batting average has increased by only 14 points, which might not seem particularly significant at first glance. The slugging percentage, however, has jumped by more than 130 points, while his expected slugging percentage has risen from .363 to .497. That number matters. Expected metrics are designed to separate contact quality from actual results. In other words, they attempt to answer a simple question: what should have happened based on how the ball came off the bat? During his first 34 games, Semien produced contact quality consistent with a .363 xSlG. Over his last 31 games, that figure has climbed to .497. That's an absurd jump more in line with the superstar he once was rather than the role player he seemed to become in recent years. His current batting average may even be understating the improvement. While he hit .232 during this stretch, his expected batting average reached .292. That 60-point gap suggests there could still be positive regression ahead. Fewer empty swings, more productive contact The most meaningful adjustments don’t necessarily show up in the traditional production numbers. When a veteran struggles early in a season, conversations often focus on dramatic changes in approach. That hasn’t really been the case for Semien. His chase rate has barely moved, increasing from 29.8% to 30.3%. His overall swing rate has actually declined slightly from 51.8% to 50.6%. What has changed is his ability to connect when he swings. Period O-Contact% Z-Contact% Contact% Barrel% Hard Hit% First 34 games 54.2% 88.6% 79.6% 6.8% 34.1% Last 31 games 59.1% 90.2% 81.6% 9.9% 37.6% His contact rate on pitches outside the zone has increased by nearly five percentage points. Contact within the strike zone has improved as well. The result has been fewer whiffs and more balls put in play. But the story doesn't stop there. If a hitter simply makes more contact without increasing the damage, the outcome is usually more weakly hit balls. That's not what's happening here; Semien is making more contact while simultaneously producing better contact. His barrel rate has climbed from 6.8% to 9.9%, an increase of 3.1 percentage points (roughly 46%). His hard-hit rate has risen by more than three percentage points. Even his 90th-percentile exit velocity has improved from 101.7 mph to 102.5 mph. That means his best contact is now more dangerous than it was during the season's opening month. There's also another number that helps explain the transformation: Semien's average launch angle has dropped from 19.2 degrees to 17.7 degrees. That may not sound like a dramatic adjustment, but it is significant. During the first stretch of the season, Semien was frequently lifting balls that weren't struck with enough authority to become extra-base hits. Many of those balls ended up as relatively routine fly-outs. A slightly lower launch angle combined with better contact quality is often a favorable combination. It creates more productive batted-ball trajectories and allows a greater percentage of hard-hit balls to find gaps instead of gloves. The simultaneous increases in Barrel%, Hard-Hit%, and xSLG point directly toward that conclusion. Yes, it's still too early to know how far Semien's resurgence can go. What the last 31 games show, however, is a hitter generating more quality contact and producing the kind of underlying metrics the Mets expected from the beginning. After a difficult first month, that's a trend that is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. View full article

Image courtesy of © John Jones-Imagn Images There was one number the Blue Jays could no longer ignore: -33. Thirty-three outs above average on the negative side, accumulated across seven years of trying to make Bichette work as a shortstop. Thirty-three outs that eventually turned into runs. The Mets knew it. And they bet on the improvement anyway. The story of the “Bo Bichette at third base experiment” in Queens began as a footnote, one of those ideas that sounds clever at a winter press conference but rarely survives contact with the reality of April baseball. The kind of move analysts label a “creative solution” and skeptics call “desperation disguised as strategy.” As it turns out, this one survived. And the metrics so far explain why with remarkable clarity. But to reach that conclusion, you have to follow the entire path. You have to understand where Bichette comes from, what broke in Toronto, and why that same flaw suddenly becomes perfectly functional in a different context. Bo Bichette's Bat Arrived Before the Glove Before talking about what Bichette is doing in the field, it’s necessary to talk about what’s happening at the plate. Because if there was always one thing that justified patience with him — in Toronto or anywhere else — it was the bat. And in 2026, that bat still hasn’t met expectations. The numbers are uncomfortable: .217/.266/.316, a 68 wRC+, and a tiny .099 ISO. For context, his career line in those same categories is .289/.332/.459 with a 118 wRC+. This is not simply a cold streak. This is a different level of offensive dysfunction, the kind that frustrates fans and forces people to search for root causes instead of waiting for regression to fix everything on its own. Metric 2025 (TOR) 2026 NYM Career AVG .311 .217 .289 OBP .357 .266 .332 SLG .483 .316 .459 wRC+ 134 68 118 ISO .172 .099 .170 xwOBA .353 .321 .341 And yet, there is one detail preventing full-scale panic: the .321 xwOBA against an actual .263 wOBA. The gap between expected and observed production is nearly 60 points, a difference that in Statcast language translates more to sustained bad luck than true collapse. His .241 BABIP — compared to a .333 career mark — screams positive regression. His barrels remain respectable: a 6.9% barrel rate and 44.6% hard-hit rate. The quality of contact is still there. The results are not. There’s more in the bat-tracking data. His SwStr% dropped to 7.6%, the lowest mark of his career. He’s making contact. He’s showing patience (6.6% walk rate) but he’s hitting the ball on the ground far too often: a 51.4% groundball rate, also a career high. His opposite-field contact climbed to 37.7%, another number that historically correlates with stretches of diminished production for him. Something in the swing mechanics is failing to create the launch angle he needs. Projection systems, however, remain optimistic. FanGraphs DC projects him for a 110 wRC+ the rest of the way. Steamer says 112. ZiPS projects sustained 109-112 wRC+ production through 2028. The projection market consensus does not see a broken player. It sees a hitter who started cold and should eventually look like the same player who posted a 134 wRC+ in Toronto in 2025 once the BABIP normalizes. The question is not whether Bichette will hit again. It’s whether the Mets can sustain this defensive experiment while waiting for the offense to wake up. And the answer, at least so far, appears to be yes. Precisely because at third base, for the first time in his career, he is no longer costing them anything in the field while he searches for his timing at the plate. The Problem Toronto Never Solved To understand why this works defensively in Flushing, you first have to understand why it failed in Toronto. The Fielding Run Value numbers tell the story of an entire career filled with accumulated defensive losses: Year Teams Pos FRV OAA Attempts Success Rate 2021 TOR SS -4 -6 569 73% 2022 TOR SS -5 -7 566 75% 2023 TOR SS -4 -3 425 71% 2025 TOR SS -10 -13 455 69% Career SS -25 -30 2,687 72% His OAA success rate dropped all the way to 69% in his final Toronto season, three points below expected. He became the worst shortstop in baseball in Outs Above Average, and the third-worst defender at any position among qualified players. But the truly revealing detail is not the total number. It’s the anatomy of the failure. Bichette’s central problem as a shortstop was always his lateral range toward third base: -6 in 2021, -10 in 2022, -4 in 2025. Moving to his left was not merely a weakness. It was his greatest vulnerability, the zone opposing hitters eventually learned to attack because information travels quickly in this sport. And still, Toronto kept waiting for defensive improvement that never came. Year after year. As if the Bichette surname itself justified the patience. There’s something tragic about that, and something understandable too. Bichette was a prospect whose identity had been tied to shortstop since adolescence. His father, Dante Bichette, played in the major leagues. His identity as a prospect, franchise cornerstone, and face of Toronto’s rebuild was stitched directly to the position. Moving him off shortstop was not just a tactical decision. It almost felt like an institutional admission of failure. The Blue Jays never managed to separate the player from the narrative. The Mets project arrived without that emotional baggage. That changed everything. The Position Shift That Changes Everything When a shortstop cannot move effectively to his left, the consequences are catastrophic. The hole between shortstop and third base is one of the most demanding zones on the field, where range, transfer, and arm strength determine whether a right-handed hitter ends up with a single or an out. Bichette consistently lost there. But when a third baseman struggles moving to his right — toward the line and foul territory — the position demands that skill far less frequently. Third base protects him from his worst flaw. At the hot corner, his weakness is hidden in a region where relatively few balls are actually hit. The 2026 OAA numbers confirm the theory: Year Team Pos FRV OAA Left Right Attempts Success Rate Added 2025 TOR SS -10 -13 -5 -3 -4 69% -3% 2026 NYM SS 1 1 -1 0 2 73% 1% 2026 NYM 3B 1 2 1 1 0 67% 2% 2026 NYM ALL 2 2 — — — 69% 2% The most revealing detail is the directional split at third base: +1 moving to his right — toward the line — and +1 moving to his left. The direction that once represented his Achilles’ heel at shortstop is now simply one component among many, no longer the defining factor determining whether a defensive inning ends in disaster. The position flipped the equation. That +2% success-rate-added number deserves attention. It is not enormous. It is not prime Nolan Arenado. But it is positive. Consistently positive. And for a player who spent his entire career producing negative defensive value, that is not a marginal improvement. It is a categorical shift. Bichette has gone from being a defensive liability to becoming, in value terms, an above-average defender at his position. From a roster-construction standpoint, that represents millions of dollars in defensive WAR the Mets are essentially receiving for free, bundled inside the contract of a hitter who already justified his salary with the bat alone. A bat that still appears close to waking up. On the 2026 OAA leaderboard among third basemen, he ranks sixth. He is not a Gold Glover yet, but he sits above Arenado, above Alex Bregman, above Matt Chapman in outs generated. For an organization making a calculated gamble, that is more than enough. The Arm as the Hidden Variable There is another detail in the data that does not immediately jump off the page, but one every talent evaluator should underline in red: throwing velocity. The arm-strength leaderboard ranks Bichette third among all third basemen in baseball: Rk. Player FRV OAA Vel. Avg. Vel. máx 1 Garcia, Maikel (KC) 5 5 88.2 mph 89.1 2 Chapman, Matt (SF) 3 2 86.1 mph 88.3 3 Bichette, Bo (NYM) 1 2 82.9 mph 88.6 4 Machado, Manny (SD) 3 3 83.6 mph 85.5 5 Ramírez, José (CLE) 2 4 83.4 mph 85.6 At shortstop, that arm was almost redundant. Difficult throws from the hole rarely rewarded his raw strength because the problem was reaching the baseball in the first place. At third base, however, that same arm becomes an entirely different weapon. At the hot corner, nearly every difficult play ends with the longest throw in the infield. The backhand near the line, where the fielder stretches, fields from an awkward angle, and still has to fire across the diamond. The bunt play, where the third baseman charges forward, gathers the ball on the move, then plants and throws before the runner arrives. The slow roller that punishes hesitation. In all those situations, the difference between an out and a hit is arm strength. An 88.6 mph max throw from third base is not a trivial detail. It is the difference between a difficult out and a single nobody remembers. And that arm was always there. The interesting part is that Bichette did not develop new strength. For the first time in his career, he is simply playing a position where that tool exists in its ideal environment. The Mets did not teach him something new. They changed the stage. That, ultimately, is what makes this story bigger than Bo Bichette. It is a story about how organizations cling to mistakes. About how the sunk cost of a previous decision — the draft pick, the contract, the public narrative — can cloud years of accumulated evidence. Toronto watched it happen in real time and could not act. The Mets arrived later, looked at the same numbers, and made the decision Toronto could not make for five years. In baseball, sometimes the competitive advantage is not discovering something new. It is seeing clearly what has been sitting in front of everyone all along. The experiment ended before it even began. It is no longer an experiment. It is a solution. And the solution had been waiting for years for someone willing to look at the data without blinking. View full article

Image courtesy of © Brad Mills-Imagn Images Devin Williams slapped Mark Vientos on the shoulder and roared toward the Mets dugout last Sunday at Citi Field while the crowd showered him with applause. Austin Wells had grounded into a double play. Vientos’ lightning-quick play at first base to start the classic “3-6-3” double play with shortstop Bo Bichette ended the Yankees’ rally and left them scoreless in the top of the tenth inning. The revamped Williams once again exceeded expectations. He did it by retiring all three hitters he faced to earn his sixth save of the season — his fourth consecutive hitless appearance. Then, after Tyrone Taylor’s dramatic game-tying homer in the bottom of the ninth on Sunday made it 6-6, Williams delivered again in the biggest moment, giving the Mets a chance to win the Subway Series at home. And they did. Carson Benge hit a walk-off grounder, and the Mets defeated the Yankees 7-6 in the series finale. The Yankees have not won the Subway Series since sweeping the Mets in 2017. Every pitch carries pressure, every inning feels heavier, especially after the Mets’ rocky start in April. For much of April, the Mets bullpen created a strange feeling: too much talent to look this vulnerable. It was not a velocity issue. It was not a lack of stuff. It was something harder to identify at first glance — and far more dangerous for a contender. Their top relievers had lost the ability to control how hitters reacted against them. Swings no longer looked uncomfortable. At-bats stopped feeling rushed. Opposing lineups entered the late innings believing they could survive them. And in modern baseball, especially for teams built to compete in October, that changes everything. A dominant bullpen shortens games. It allows managers to aggressively navigate the first six innings knowing the game can effectively end in the seventh. That is exactly what the Mets stopped having for several weeks. Devin Williams looked like a pitcher trapped between two versions of himself. Luke Weaver, whose recent reinvention had quietly become one of the most fascinating stories among relievers, began losing the depth and precision that allowed him to avoid damage. The result came quickly: too many extended innings, too much hard contact, and too many situations where every lead started feeling fragile. But May has looked completely different. And the numbers help explain why. Improvements From Devin Williams and Luke Weaver Split Pitcher Rslt G Dec IP H R ER HR BB SO SO% GB% BF ERA Last 10 games Devin Williams 8-2 9 W-L:2-0,Sv:4 9 2/3 2 0 0 0 2 11 40.7% 43.8% 27 0.00 Previous 6 games Devin Williams 3-3 6 W-L:1-1,Sv:1,BSv:1 4 13 8 8 1 4 9 31.0% 26.1% 29 18.00 Last 8 games Luke Weaver 8-0 6 W-L:0-0,Hld:3 9 1/3 6 0 0 0 4 14 37.9% 44.4% 29 0.00 Previous 7 games Luke Weaver 1-6 7 W-L:1-1,BSv:2,Hld:1 7 9 8 8 2 2 5 15.6% 50.0% 32 10.29 The statistical differences are dramatic enough to feel almost unreal. Williams went from allowing eight runs in four innings to stringing together double-digit nearly flawless appearances. Weaver went from a stretch where hitters were barreling baseballs consistently to a scoreless run while nearly doubling his ability to generate swings and misses. A large part of the Mets’ collapse in April felt inevitable whenever Williams and Weaver struggled. The results are there. Williams’ rough outings were part of a 3-3 stretch for the club in the six appearances before his current streak of nine nearly perfect relief outings. Weaver’s struggles came within an even more chaotic stretch, with the Mets going 1-6. And it makes sense: Weaver pitches before Williams. If he falters, Williams often never becomes an option because the scoreboard changes and the Mets’ chances of winning disappear before the ninth inning arrives. But the most important development is not simply the reduction in damage. It is the way both pitchers regained control of at-bats. When Williams struggled, his innings felt long. Hitters no longer looked uncomfortable working from behind in counts. The changeup still moved, but something fundamental had disappeared: the visual effect of his entire arsenal. His famous changeup has always been devastating, but it never worked in isolation. The pitch survives because of the threat of the fastball. That is exactly what the newest data shows. How They Are Reclaiming Their Dominance Pitcher Total Pitch Pitch% BA ISO xBA xOBP xSLG BABIP Whiffs% Barrel% K% Williams, Devin 274 FF 16.1 .000 .000 .093 .194 .171 .000 52.9 0 44.4 Williams, Devin 274 CH 12.4 .000 .000 .091 .167 .113 .000 47.6 0 41.7 Weaver, Luke 311 CH 13.8 .067 .000 .097 .203 .131 .125 32.3 0 41.2 Weaver, Luke 311 FF 17.4 .333 .000 .215 .294 .240 .600 3.8 0 40 Weaver, Luke 311 FC 7.4 .500 .000 .495 .495 .565 .500 60 0 0 The table explains something essential about Williams: his dominance returned once he reestablished vertical aggression with the fastball. During April, too many fastballs drifted into neutral zones, particularly at heights where hitters could stay balanced and recognize the changeup early. The result was devastating for a pitcher whose effectiveness depends on sequential deception. The new whiff chart against the four-seam fastball reveals a completely different reality. Williams has returned to attacking above the strike zone, especially in the upper inside quadrants, where swing-and-miss rates have exploded. Entire zones are now producing extreme whiff percentages, completely changing the dynamic of the at-bat. That happens because the fastball does not necessarily need to generate weak contact to dominate. Its effect comes from accelerating decisions. When the fastball explodes at the top of the zone with vertical life, hitters feel forced to begin their swing earlier. And that is where Williams’ real trick appears: the changeup comes out of the exact same visual tunnel before disappearing beneath the bat too late for hitters to adjust. Williams had allowed an astonishing .857 BABIP during the previous six-game stretch. His weapons were completely disconnected. Now, opponents have dropped to a .071 BABIP against him. It is not only that he is striking hitters out and generating elite swing-and-miss rates with the fastball. He is also eliminating damaging contact. That is why both pitches are functioning so aggressively at the same time. The fastball owns a 52.9% whiff rate. The changeup sits at 47.6%. Neither pitch has allowed a barrel. Hitters are making the wrong decisions from the very beginning of the at-bat. That difference may look subtle from the outside, but it completely transforms the offensive experience against a reliever. In April, hitters looked like they were waiting for mistakes. Now they look reactive. Weaver found his adjustment from a different place, but one equally important. His problem was never the total absence of swings and misses. The issue emerged when he lost the ability to control the type of contact he allowed. Too many changeups stayed over the plate or entered trajectories where hitters could fully extend their arms. The exit velocity chart against the changeup clearly shows how he corrected that. The weakest contact consistently appears below the strike zone, especially on the lower outer edge, where exit velocities collapse to minimal levels. There are balls coming off the bat at 75 and 77 mph — essentially dead contact from the moment of impact. That reflects exactly who Weaver needs to be in order to dominate. Unlike Williams, Weaver does not survive by destroying timing. He survives by manipulating the contact plane. Even during his worst stretch, his ground-ball profile remained alive, producing a 50% ground-ball rate. When the changeup finishes low, it forces hitters to either pound the top half of the baseball or swing over it entirely. The damage disappears because the swing never finds the correct angle. And the chart also reveals where the problem existed during his rough stretch. The only area where the changeup was truly punished came on pitches located low and inside, where exit velocities climbed above 90 mph. That small location mistake was enough to completely alter his innings. Now he is avoiding that zone entirely. And that explains why the Mets are beginning to recover something far more important than attractive statistics: they are recovering the feeling of control at the end of games. With the Williams-Weaver duo dominating, the Mets bullpen has improved to a 2.44 ERA during the month of May. Now the problems lie elsewhere. Without the blowups from Tobias Myers and Craig Kimbrel, that bullpen ERA drops all the way to 1.30. And that is the key here: Williams has restored fear from the top of the strike zone. Weaver has returned to eliminating damage from the bottom. Together, they are rebuilding the emotional structure every bullpen needs if it hopes to get to and survive October. View full article

Image courtesy of © Vincent Carchietta-Imagn Images At times, baseball feels like a memory test. On Mat 13, Carson Benge started passing it. The ball that came off his bat in the 10th inning barely cleared the infield, a low, sharp line drive that split the middle of the diamond before the Detroit Tigers could react. From second base, A.J. Ewing never looked back. By the time he touched home plate, the New York Mets had won another improbable game, 3-2 at Citi Field, and Benge had his first major-league walk-off hit. But the single was not really the beginning of the story. It was the response. Hours earlier, Benge had endured the kind of night that perfectly captures how difficult it is to be a rookie in New York. He misplayed a line drive in right field that sparked Detroit’s early rally. Later, in the seventh inning, he was thrown out at the plate after getting a late break on a double steal attempt. In the decisive moment of the play, his first reaction was a step backward. Two visible mistakes. Two moments where the game seemed to move faster than he did. And yet, he still ended up deciding the game. That is precisely what makes his May performance so interesting. Roughly two weeks ago, Benge woke up carrying a .498 OPS and an offense that looked trapped somewhere between mechanical adjustments and recognition issues. Across March and April, he hit just .189 with a .278 slugging percentage. He went 2-for-18 (.111) against breaking pitches and 3-for-19 (.158) against off-speed offerings. His combined whiff rate climbed to 31.3%. The clearest positive sign was that he had homered against every pitch type. When he connected, his swing still generated average exit velocities above 90 mph. But pitchers had already started discovering the blueprint for attacking him. First came the mix of breaking balls and changeups. Then came the finishing touch: the fastball. That became the real stress test. In April, 48% of Benge’s strikeouts came against fastballs. At times, his swing looked late. Other times, his hands and pitch recognition appeared too delayed to attack pitches in the zone. The breaking point arrived on April 26 and 27, when Benge struck out four times in eight plate appearances to close the month during a series against the Washington Nationals. Since then, Benge has started solving the problem. The results are beginning to look encouraging. The samples remain small, but meaningful. Just look at the evolution of his walk and strikeout rates: March/April: 5 walks (5.1 BB%), 17 strikeouts (17.1 K%) in 97 plate appearances. May: 4 walks (10 BB%), 6 strikeouts (15 K%) through that May 13 walk-off Benge made his MLB debut on March 26 with a two-walk game. His next multi-walk performance did not arrive until May 3. Since the recent adjustments, his .240 on-base percentage from April has jumped to a near-.400 mark this month. In other words: he has renewed his approach at the plate, he is selecting pitches more effectively, and the success is finally beginning to follow. Those are exactly the kinds of signs the Mets were hoping to see, especially during this difficult stretch in which the club is dealing with injuries to several key players. Beyond Benge’s clutch hit, let’s take a closer look at the surprisingly rapid offensive growth he is beginning to show at the plate. Sign #1: He Can Now Compete Against MLB Velocity Pitchers usually challenge rookies with one simple question: “Can you hit MLB fastballs?” During April, the answer still felt incomplete. But May has changed the conversation. Against fastballs, Benge now looks like a hitter capable of sustaining quality at-bats. He is hitting .294 against heaters, while the expected metrics suggest even more production ahead: a .335 xBA and a .596 xSLG. The quality of contact supports the adjustment as well. His average exit velocity against fastballs is now above 92.3 mph. That explains a significant portion of his recent offensive surge. The clearest example came in the matchup that ended Wednesday’s game and sent Citi Field into chaos. Tigers right-hander Drew Anderson tried to challenge him with a 97 mph fastball over the plate. You already know what happened. Benge was ready to punish velocity. But Anderson’s mistake was not just the pitch selection. The fastball leaked directly into a danger zone against this newer version of Benge. “Simply don’t throw it there.” That has been Benge’s recent message to the league. His swing has dominated pitches in the upper part of the zone, showing notable improvement compared to some of the breakdowns visible earlier in the season. If Benge starts solving pitches on the outer edge, his offensive evolution could accelerate even further. The improvement in his slugging percentage, barrel rate, and hard-hit rate all originates from the same place: he is getting to the fastball much better now. He no longer looks like a hitter merely trying to survive major-league reaction time. Now, he looks prepared to punish it. When a rookie starts winning that battle, the entire at-bat changes. Sign #2: The Real Test Is Still Spin The crack still exists. And the numbers practically underline it. Against breaking balls, Benge is hitting just .167, with a .204 xwOBA and a 25.6% whiff rate. Visually, the issue shows up too: uncomfortable swings, late contact, and too many sliders that begin in the zone before disappearing beneath his hands. That is probably where much of his difficult April was born. Once the scouting reports spread around the league, pitchers stopped attacking him exclusively with fastballs. They began expanding the zone with spin, forcing him to make decisions later in the count. The game sped up on him. But even within that problem, there is an important sign hiding underneath: he has probably experienced some bad luck against certain breaking pitches. Because although the results remain poor, his xSLG against breaking balls (.277) is noticeably better than the overall quality of contact suggests. The limited extra-base production and inconsistent contact indicate that some of the contact he is producing has not yet fully translated into sustainable offensive damage. And there is an even more interesting detail against off-speed pitches. He is hitting only .185 against them, but his xBA approaches .300 and his xSLG climbs to .455. That usually means one thing: the recognition is beginning to arrive before the results do. And for a young hitter, that is often the most important frontier in development. The key point that should stay in perspective? Entering Wednesday’s game, Benge had already reduced his whiff rate against breaking balls from 31.3% down to 9.1%. Better fastball damage. More contact against breaking pitches. Improved balance against changeups. That is where the turn begins. Sign #3: The Game Has Stopped Breaking Him Inning by Inning That May 13 game was probably the clearest evidence of that, because baseball goes far beyond swings, tablet reviews, and hours spent studying advanced scouting reports on video. A month ago, a night like that might have consumed him. An early defensive mistake. A poor read at home plate. Citi Field growing tense around him. The classic environment where rookies begin chasing heroic swings in an attempt to erase previous mistakes. But Benge did not do that. His at-bat in the 10th inning was small, simple, and mature. He did not try to lift the ball. He did not chase the emotional home run. He simply took the pitch and shot a line drive back through the middle of the field. That is development too. Because the Mets are no longer watching only an athletic prospect trying to survive rookie turbulence. They are beginning to see something more interesting: a hitter who has already answered the first Major League question — the fastball — and is now entering the real offensive chess match of this league. Learning to recognize the slider that looks like a strike for twenty feet before vanishing. The devastating changeup. That is where many rookies break. And that is exactly where Carson Benge appears to be growing. Need further proof? How about this: Mere days later, the budding star delivered his second walk-off hit of the week to close out the Subway Series. View full article

Image courtesy of © Vincent Carchietta-Imagn Images By mid-May, New York is still trying to figure out what kind of teams the Yankees and Mets actually are. The Yankees continue winning just enough games to remain firmly inside the American League conversation, but they arrive at the Subway Series carrying bullpen concerns and an offense that finished its series against the Baltimore Orioles with 15 consecutive scoreless innings. When Aaron Judge and Ben Rice are not producing, the Yankees’ offense has struggled badly to create runs. The Mets, meanwhile, are trapped between conflicting signals: Francisco Lindor, Luis Robert Jr., Jorge Polanco, Francisco Álvarez, Ronny Mauricio, and Kodai Senga are all on the injured list. Bo Bichette’s elite swing still looks disconnected—he currently owns the worst barrel rate of his career at just 3.4%. In the middle of the chaos, Juan Soto is enduring one of the worst offensive stretches of his recent career, yet around him, small signs of a more dangerous and less improvised lineup are beginning to emerge. That is what makes this edition of the Subway Series feel different. It does not arrive as a simple rivalry series on the calendar. It arrives at that uncomfortable point of the season when the first cracks start feeling real. When offensive struggles stop looking temporary. When teams begin understanding which parts of the roster truly work and which ones are still surviving more on reputation than production. And that is why this series feels far heavier than a typical May matchup. Because while the noise surrounding Juan Soto and Aaron Judge will dominate every headline, the true backdrop of this Subway Series feels deeper: two teams trying to prove there is still a more dangerous version of themselves hidden underneath all the inconsistency. The Yankees enter the series having lost five of their last six games, while the Mets just completed their first sweep of the season behind five home runs Thursday against the Detroit Tigers. Over the last decade, the Mets have controlled the Subway Series with a 25-23 record and a plus-33 run differential (253-220). If we narrow the sample to the last five seasons, the Mets own two series victories and three splits, including a 2024 sweep with wins at both Yankee Stadium and Citi Field, respectively. New York Mets vs. New York Yankees New York Mets New York Yankees Rk Season GP W L R R GP W L R R 1 2025 6 3 3 29 33 6 3 3 33 29 2 2024 4 4 0 36 14 4 0 4 14 36 3 2023 4 2 2 20 16 4 2 2 16 20 4 2022 4 2 2 13 13 4 2 2 13 13 5 2021 6 4 2 44 29 6 2 4 29 44 6 2020 6 3 3 29 29 6 3 3 29 29 7 2019 4 2 2 20 23 4 2 2 23 20 8 2018 6 3 3 27 25 6 3 3 25 27 9 2017 4 0 4 14 21 4 4 0 21 14 10 2016 4 2 2 21 17 4 2 2 17 21 11 2015 6 2 4 20 31 6 4 2 31 20 12 2014 4 2 2 21 19 4 2 2 19 21 13 2013 4 4 0 16 7 4 0 4 7 16 14 2012 6 1 5 21 32 6 5 1 32 21 15 2011 6 2 4 14 29 6 4 2 29 14 16 2010 6 3 3 19 18 6 3 3 18 19 17 2009 6 1 5 17 44 6 5 1 44 17 18 2008 6 4 2 38 25 6 2 4 25 38 19 2007 6 3 3 27 34 6 3 3 34 27 20 2006 6 3 3 30 35 6 3 3 35 30 21 2005 6 3 3 32 23 6 3 3 23 32 22 2004 6 4 2 43 38 6 2 4 38 43 23 2003 6 0 6 19 39 6 6 0 39 19 24 2002 6 3 3 29 27 6 3 3 27 29 25 2001 6 2 4 20 26 6 4 2 26 20 26 2000 6 2 4 24 25 6 4 2 25 24 27 1999 6 3 3 30 28 6 3 3 28 30 28 1998 3 1 2 8 16 3 2 1 16 8 29 1997 3 1 2 11 9 3 2 1 9 11 Totals 152 69 83 692 725 152 83 69 725 692 Heading into a promising weekend series that opens with a pitching matchup between Cam Schlittler and Clay Holmes, here are five storylines that could shape the direction of the Subway Series: 1. Juan Soto vs. Aaron Judge Everything starts, naturally, with Juan Soto and Aaron Judge, former teammates in 2024. Because while the marketing will sell this matchup as a battle between superstars, the interesting part is not simply who is performing—it is who will carry the heavier pressure. Judge still looks like the gravitational center of the Yankees lineup. Over the last ten days, he is slashing .278/.409/.583 with three home runs and a .992 OPS. Those numbers almost feel routine for him now, but behind the production lies a deeper issue: New York has needed virtually every Judge swing to keep the offense alive. Because around him, there are concerning signs. Paul Goldschmidt is probably enjoying his best offensive stretch of the season, posting a 1.256 OPS with three home runs—two of them leadoff shots—in eight games. But after that, the lineup collapses into a dangerous mixture of late swings, strikeouts, and rallies that never fully materialize. Jazz Chisholm Jr. has struck out 14 times in ten games. Ben Rice is hitting just .125. Austin Wells sits at .095. And then comes the statistic that changes the tone of the entire series: the Yankees enter without scoring a run over their last 15 innings. Since leaving Yankee Stadium, the offense has collapsed on the road, hitting .158 with runners in scoring position over the last six games. They have struck out 14 times while drawing only four walks. The only memorable productive swing was Trent Grisham’s three-run homer Tuesday that capped a five-run rally in the third inning. Since then, the Yankees have not scored again. On the other side, Soto is not arriving hot either. He is arriving under pressure. Although he hit his fifth home run of the season and drove in two runs Thursday during the Mets’ five-homer explosion to complete the sweep over Detroit, Soto is still searching offensively. His line over the last eight games stood at .138/.212/.310, far from the elite discipline and zone control that define his profile. But the context around Soto has started to change. The Mets do not look explosive offensively, yet they do appear to be finding a more functional structure. Carson Benge is beginning to look like a hitter finally understanding the rhythm of the major leagues. His .379 average and .971 OPS over the last eight games represent stability in front of Soto. His swings no longer look rushed. There is now intention behind them, especially against fastballs in the middle of the zone, and that changes the entire offensive dynamic for the Mets. The 21-year-old rookie A.J. Ewing has also made an impact in his recent debut with the Mets. After launching the first home run of his career Thursday against Tigers right-hander Keider Montero, Ewing has gone 3-for-9 with two extra-base hits, including a triple. He has also drawn four walks—more than his three strikeouts—and stolen a base. Mark Vientos has two home runs and seven RBIs over his last nine games, while Brett Baty, who homered Thursday, has also delivered quality at-bats. It is not a dominant offense. But it is one that seems to be searching for a more coherent identity. So once again, the expectation will center on how much impact Juan Soto and Aaron Judge can create, but the true turning point may depend on how hot the hitters around them become. 2. Can the Mets stop Cam Schlittler? One of the biggest arms to watch in the entire series is undoubtedly Cam Schlittler, who has posted a 0.57 ERA with 29 strikeouts and only one home run allowed across 31 2/3 innings over his last five starts. During that span, opposing hitters have slashed just .168/.223/.212 against Schlittler while generating 67 whiffs. But the interesting part is not only the ERA or the sheer volume of swing-and-miss. It is the way he controls at-bats. Some young pitchers survive by hiding on the edges of the strike zone. Schlittler appears to do the exact opposite: he challenges hitters. His fastball plays above the zone with late life, and that could become especially uncomfortable for this Mets lineup, which at times still depends too heavily on early-count contact. Against four-seam fastballs, the Mets have produced the worst on-base percentage (.304) in baseball and the second-worst ISO (.127), trailing only the Red Sox (.115). That is where one of the central conflicts of the series emerges, because Schlittler throws his four-seam fastball 44% of the time and attacks the upper part of the zone with 51% of those pitches. This advanced report probably will not surprise you: Lowest OBP against high four-seam fastballs this season Table context: The leaderboard is sorted by lowest OBP allowed among pitchers with at least 20 plate appearances ending on a high fastball, either inside or outside the strike zone. Behind Jacob deGrom, Schlittler owns the second-best whiff rate (32.3%) in this group of upper-zone fastball predators, as well as the second-best strikeout rate (38.3%), trailing only Paul Skenes (38.5%). That is not good news for the Mets lineup, because Soto is struggling. Bo Bichette arrives offensively lost, carrying a .369 OPS over recent days, although his .314 expected batting average against four-seamers and 61.8% hard-hit rate suggest he has also been somewhat unlucky. Without key hitters like Lindor, Robert, Polanco, and Álvarez, several secondary Mets bats still show problems adjusting to sustained velocity up around the hands. That is why Schlittler could completely control the rhythm of the game if he gets ahead in counts, especially while pairing the four-seamer with a devastating cutter that has held hitters to a .113 average without an extra-base hit in 57 plate appearances. The Yankees and Mets both arrive with inconsistent offenses, but Schlittler possesses the exact type of profile capable of turning a bad offensive week into a full-blown multi-day crisis. 3. Freddy Peralta and Clay Holmes could extend the Yankees’ offensive collapse Perhaps the most interesting matchup of the entire series is not Soto versus Judge. Perhaps it is Freddy Peralta versus the Yankees. Peralta represents exactly the kind of starter that has historically disrupted this lineup: elevated fastballs, hidden velocity, and enough slider usage to destroy aggressive swings. Now the question becomes whether Peralta will bring back his fastball the way he did in his last start, when he generated 13 whiffs against the Detroit Tigers on Tuesday. Eleven of those 13 misses (85%) came on the four-seam fastball. The rest were split between the changeup and slider. That was encouraging news for the Mets, although there is another layer here; the Yankees have crushed sliders all season, leading baseball with 14 home runs, a .260 ISO, and a 45.3% hard-hit rate against the pitch. So, which version of these Yankees will appear against Peralta? What adjustments will they make? We will find out soon enough. If we dive into the individual matchups, another fascinating detail appears immediately: Judge has faced Peralta three times and still does not have a hit against him, striking out twice. The sample is tiny, but it perfectly captures the visual conflict Peralta often creates for larger hitters. The ball seems to appear on top of them. Still, the history also carries warnings. Goldschmidt has hit two home runs against Peralta and owns an .887 OPS in the matchup. Cody Bellinger has also punished him historically with an OPS north of 1.100. That forces Peralta to pitch with more precision than aggression. Against this offensively limited version of the Yankees, he probably does not need to dominate the entire lineup—he simply needs to prevent Judge and Bellinger from changing the game with one swing, especially since Aaron Boone typically avoids starting Goldschmidt against right-handed pitching. On the Mets' side, Clay Holmes could quietly become one of the most important figures of the series. Holmes’ old problem has always been the same: when the sinker loses depth, everything unravels quickly. Early this season, opponents are finding the sinker more often. His whiff rate has dropped from 16.4% to 12.8%, and his strikeout rate has declined by 5.5%. The sinker remains the foundation of his mix, but now the sweeper has become the true put-away weapon, generating 52% of his strikeouts. If Holmes’ movement shows up, he could turn games into a sequence of weak grounders and uncomfortable swings. During this 15-inning scoreless streak, the Yankees look particularly vulnerable to that kind of pitching profile. New York is not simply enduring an offensive drought. The Yankees are also chasing too many pitches outside the zone and losing hard contact early in counts. Against an aggressive Holmes attacking below the strike zone, that can quickly turn into ten-pitch innings and easy outs. 4. Will the Yankees bullpen return to dominance? The Yankees bullpen enters the Subway Series with numbers that inspire both confidence and concern at the same time. The positive side is obvious enough: there is still plenty of swing-and-miss to finish important games. The group has recorded 17 strikeouts in 17 innings over the last six games, and arms like David Bednar and Fernando Cruz continue generating whiffs even when they do not look fully dominant. Bednar owns 13.5 strikeouts per nine innings during that stretch, while Cruz carries a 4.0 strikeout-to-walk ratio, signs that the Yankees still possess relievers capable of surviving traffic through pure stuff. But the problems emerge immediately afterward: too much hard contact and too many unstable innings. The bullpen owns a collective 4.76 ERA over the last six games, has allowed four home runs, and several relievers are living through outings where one mistake destroys the entire inning. Camilo Doval still does not look fully consistent inside the strike zone. Brent Headrick surrendered two home runs in just two innings. Paul Blackburn arrives especially vulnerable with three walks and a 2.25 WHIP in only 2 2/3 innings. Even the overall bullpen profile is starting to reveal something interesting: too many dangerous fly balls and not enough complete weak-contact suppression outside of what Tim Hill has provided, as he continues looking like the steadiest reliever in the group because of his ability to generate ground balls consistently. And that could matter greatly against the Mets. Because even if this offense is not exploding consistently, it is beginning to create offensive traffic ahead of Soto. If the Mets force games into the bullpen early—especially in situations where Aaron Boone must extend secondary relievers—the series could suddenly open the door to chaotic innings. The problem for the Yankees is that this no longer looks like a bullpen that simply enters and suffocates games automatically. Right now it looks more human. More vulnerable to the big inning. And in an emotional series like the Subway Series, that can change everything with one swing. The contrast between both bullpens could quietly become one of the defining themes of the weekend. While the Yankees enter with a 4.76 ERA over their last six games and several relievers vulnerable to hard contact, the Mets bullpen appears to be stabilizing at exactly the right moment. New York’s bullpen ERA sits at 3.16 over the last seven games, but the most revealing detail emerges once the disastrous outings from Tobias Myers and Craig Kimbrel are removed: the rest of the bullpen has combined for a microscopic 0.43 ERA. That completely changes the perception of the group. Devin Williams is once again generating uncomfortable swings with his changeup. Brooks Raley has been extremely stable. The Mets also enter with 30 strikeouts in 25 2/3 innings during that stretch. More than overwhelming dominance, the important detail is that the bullpen seems to be producing clean innings precisely when the Yankees are enduring one of their worst offensive stretches of the season. 5. Can the Mets solve the Yankees’ left-handed starters? The end of the series could ultimately be decided by a problem that has haunted the Mets for nearly the entire season: left-handed pitching. Behind Schlittler, Carlos Rodón and Ryan Weathers will close out the series. It just so happens that the Mets own the worst OBP in Major League Baseball against left-handed pitchers (.276). That turns Rodón and Weathers into massive threats for the final games of the weekend. Current Mets hitters have combined to hit just .203 (13-for-64) with 14 strikeouts across 72 plate appearances against them. Only three hitters have homered: Tyrone Taylor, Marcus Semien, and Luis Torrens. Soto is 0-for-4 with four walks and one strikeout. Bichette is 4-for-14 (.286) with two RBIs and three strikeouts. That is why names like Soto, Bichette, and Benge become so important in this matchup. The Mets do not need to destroy Rodón. But they do need to avoid the offensive pattern that has followed them for months: late swings, nonexistent offensive traffic, and rallies dying before they even begin. Meanwhile, Ryan Weathers could quietly play a major role in Sunday’s finale. Soto has gone 4-for-8 (.500) with a home run against Weathers, while Semien is 2-for-5 with a double. The rest of the projected lineup will mostly be facing him for the first time. For many of them, their struggles against left-handed pitching this season tell the story clearly: Player Split Year G PA BA OBP SLG OPS HR RBI K% BB% MJ Melendez vs LHP 2026 2 2 .000 .000 .000 .000 0 0 50.0% 0.0% Juan Soto vs LHP 2026 19 45 .146 .222 .293 .515 1 2 20.0% 8.9% Bo Bichette vs LHP 2026 24 53 .188 .264 .313 .577 1 8 15.1% 9.4% Brett Baty vs LHP 2026 12 21 .222 .333 .278 .611 0 1 38.1% 9.5% Tyrone Taylor vs LHP 2026 19 36 .235 .235 .441 .676 2 7 22.2% 0.0% Marcus Semien vs LHP 2026 20 39 .257 .333 .314 .648 0 1 20.5% 7.7% Mark Vientos vs LHP 2026 20 43 .268 .302 .415 .717 1 3 14.0% 2.3% Carson Benge vs LHP 2026 12 21 .278 .381 .278 .659 0 1 38.1% 14.3% A.J. Ewing vs LHP 2026 2 4 .333 .500 1.000 1.500 0 1 50.0% 25.0% Luis Torrens vs LHP 2026 11 19 .353 .389 .471 .859 0 4 10.5% 5.3% The numbers speak for themselves. Soto, Bichette, Baty, and Semien will need to make quick adjustments. Benge and Ewing bring some stability in small samples, although the strikeouts remain significant. So. the story here is not simply Soto versus Judge. It is about two teams trying to prove they still have a dangerous version of themselves hidden underneath all the inconsistency. The Yankees are searching for offense again. The Mets are trying to prove they can survive velocity and left-handed pitching after finally securing their first sweep of the season. And in the middle of all that, New York once again finds itself inside a series where every inning feels heavier than normal. View full article

Image courtesy of © Ron Chenoy-Imagn Images There are starts where a pitcher simply gets lucky. Others where hard contact goes directly into gloves. And then there are the starts where something genuinely changes — where the pitching itself starts to look different even before you check the box score. Such was the case when Freddy Peralta led the way in the Mets’ 10-2 win over the Detroit Tigers at Citi Field. The Mets had not scored at least 10 runs at home since April 23, when they beat the Minnesota Twins 10-8. Peralta delivered six strong innings on 100 pitches, struck out seven, and allowed two runs, including a solo homer by Dillon Dingler. His only shaky moment came in the second inning, when Dingler demolished a hanging curveball on an 0-2 count. That didn't stop Peralta's ruthless attack on the strike zone. Wenceel Pérez slapped a single while flailing at an 0-1 fastball, and Gage Workman doubled on a low-inside changeup. Spencer Torkelson capped the inning with a sacrifice fly to left field, giving Detroit a 2-0 lead. The only barrel Freddy allowed in the inning was Dingler’s 101.8 mph home run. The Mets responded quickly against the vulnerable mix of right-hander Jack Flaherty. Mark Vientos tied the game 2-2 with a single in the third, and Carson Benge gave New York a 3-2 lead with an RBI single to left in the fourth. The knockout blow came with a six-run fifth inning, followed by two more runs in the seventh, including a triple and top prospect A.J. Ewing’s first major-league RBI in his debut. The offensive support mattered for Peralta who regained his dominance while producing his best start of the season. Where did the difference show up? The adjustment in his pitch mix generated 13 whiffs, allowed just a 17.6% HardHit rate, and only a .118 expected batting average. He had not allowed a hard-hit rate below 20% in a start since September 4, 2025, when he was still pitching for the Milwaukee Brewers. That night, he faced 20 Philadelphia Phillies hitters — an elite lineup — striking out eight and generating 14 whiffs. From a pure dominance standpoint, the stuff looked sharp. But here’s the interesting difference: only six of those 14 whiffs in that 2025 outing came on his fastball. Last night at Citi Field, the story changed completely. Peralta generated 11 whiffs with his four-seamer alone. It was not about velocity. It was about command. His fastball touched 97.2 mph, but averaged 94.4. Peralta had not generated double-digit whiffs with his fastball since September 16, 2025. Across his previous 11 starts, including last night, his highest combined total of fastball whiffs over back-to-back outings had been only 12. He threw the fastball 69% of the time against Detroit’s lineup, mixing in his changeup (15%), slider (12%), and curveball (4%). The key detail here is that the veteran right-hander established the fastball without depending exclusively on the changeup or slider to finish hitters in two-strike counts. After the second inning, the Tigers never adjusted at the plate. Peralta was still averaging 94.8 mph on the fastball by the sixth inning. That is what makes this recent stretch from Freddy Peralta so interesting: the return of his confidence in the fastball. The reduction in command mistakes. The way his secondary pitches once again complement the entire arsenal by generating chase. These last four starts are not simply telling the story of a lower ERA. They are telling something more important: the gradual return of the dominant Freddy Peralta profile we saw in 2025. Not exactly the same pitcher, mind you. But the same identity. It's the same arm that generated weak contact in key moments. The same fastball that hitters struggled to elevate. Through nine starts this season, Peralta is generating ground balls at a rate 3.5% higher than last season (36.8%), while allowing his lowest hard-hit percentage (36.2%) since 2021. The same disappearing changeup underneath barrels has returned. And above all, the same feeling that opposing swings arrive late even when hitters know what is coming. For the Mets, that is encouraging news, especially after watching Peralta battle through his first five starts of the season. Dec IP H R ER HR BB IBB SO BF ERA SO% HR% XBH% GB% W-L:1-2 26.2 19 12 12 4 10 0 28 112 4.05 25.0% 3.6% 5.4% 34.1% W-L:2-1 22.2 22 7 5 1 9 0 22 98 1.99 22.4% 1.0% 5.1% 33.3% So, what stands out here? First, the innings are leaning more toward durability over these last four outings. Peralta has been resolving plate appearances more efficiently. The strikeout rate has dipped slightly, but he is dramatically reducing power damage and extra-base hits with runners on base. The extra-base-hit rate is nearly identical, yet he has allowed only one home run while maintaining a similar ground-ball profile. The other area where his season could truly turn is in his adjustments during two-strike counts. Last night, three of the seven hits he allowed came with two strikes: Kevin McGonigle single, 90 mph exit velocity (first inning, leadoff hitter, nine-pitch at-bat with seven pitches after two strikes). Dillon Dingler solo homer, 102 mph EV (second inning, leadoff hitter). Colt Keith double, 89 mph EV (third inning, leadoff hitter). Each situation came against the first hitter of the inning, which limited the overall damage somewhat. Still, it leaves an interesting question. Split Year G GS SO ERA SO/9 SO/BB Two Strikes 2018 16 14 96 2.67 16.0 4.4 Two Strikes 2019 39 8 115 4.03 17.8 4.3 Two Strikes 2020 15 1 47 1.99 18.7 6.7 Two Strikes 2021 28 27 195 1.62 18.5 7.2 Two Strikes 2022 18 17 86 1.50 16.1 4.5 Two Strikes 2023 30 30 210 3.10 18.1 6.8 Two Strikes 2024 32 32 200 2.10 16.8 4.9 Two Strikes 2025 33 33 204 1.72 16.0 5.2 Two Strikes 2026 9 9 50 3.07 15.3 3.6 This season, Peralta has posted the lowest SO/BB ratio (3.6) of his career in two-strike counts. His strikeout rate in those situations has also dipped to a career-low 15.3 K/9. Opponents’ on-base percentage (.252) in two-strike counts is his highest since 2019 (.267). But that could begin to change if these recent adjustments continue expanding. The 2025 Version of Freddy Peralta: Velocity, Elevation, and Broken Contact The Freddy Peralta of 2025 built one of the best seasons of his career around a relatively simple idea: never allow hitters to square up the fastball. His four-seamer was devastating: .209 batting average allowed .381 slugging percentage allowed 22.8% whiff rate Just a .239 BABIP But the real key was the quality of contact. Hitters produced hard contact only 41.6% of the time against the fastball. In isolation, that number may not sound elite, but compared to the rest of his recent arsenal, it represented near-total damage control. The changeup complemented the formula perfectly: .173 batting average allowed .271 slugging percentage allowed .242 wOBA 35.2% whiff rate And the slider quietly became one of the nastiest pitches in his arsenal: .176 batting average allowed .235 slugging percentage allowed 51.5% whiff rate Everything in the repertoire worked around the same principle: uncomfortable swings and harmless contact. That is exactly what disappeared early this season. The First Five Starts: Too Much Damage on Contact Peralta’s early numbers were not disastrous. He was still striking hitters out. He was still generating whiffs. But something underneath was broken. The fastball was getting hit far too hard: 52.9% hard-hit rate .428 xSLG .349 xwOBA The changeup, historically one of his best secondary pitches, looked even worse: 77% hard-hit rate .412 average distance allowed Only a 24.5% whiff rate And the slider lived in complete chaos: 100% hard-hit rate 50% barrels per batted ball event 1.416 xSLG That was not the Freddy Peralta of 2025. That was a pitcher surviving more on raw talent than execution. The velocity remained. The spin remained. Even the strikeouts remained. But the bad swings disappeared; opponents were arriving at the baseball with far too much authority. The Last Four Starts: The Return of Weak Contact This is where the analysis becomes fascinating. Peralta did not suddenly reinvent himself. He did not show up throwing 97 mph every inning. He did not overhaul his mechanics. What changed was subtler — and probably far more sustainable. The contact started dying again. The clearest evidence is the fastball: Hard-hit rate dropped from 52.9% to 36.8% xSLG dropped from .428 to .296 Slugging allowed dropped from .311 to .208 And all of it happened with virtually identical velocity: 93.6 mph over the first five starts, 93.9 mph over the last four. That usually points to one thing: location. Peralta's fastball is living above the zone again. It is getting on barrels late again. It is generating swings underneath the baseball instead of loud contact. The changeup has also started resembling the 2025 version of himself. Even though the batting average allowed remains elevated in the small sample, almost every underlying indicator improved: Hard-hit rate dropped from 77% to 23.5% Whiff rate climbed from 24.5% to 31% Contact quality collapsed dramatically That matters far more than an inflated .412 BABIP. In fact, it may be the clearest sign that Peralta is pitching better than some of the surface-level numbers suggest. The Most Important Detail: Peralta Looks Like Himself Again The surface numbers are not identical, but the profile is becoming familiar again. The dominant Peralta of 2025 was a pitcher who: Avoided barrels Limited dangerous launch angles Generated late swings Turned the fastball into the centerpiece of everything That is exactly what is reappearing now. His recent fastball is allowing even less slugging (.208) than it did in 2025 (.381). The changeup is generating empty swings again. And the slider, while still inconsistent, has stopped giving away catastrophic contact. The difference between April and May does not look physical. It looks like precision, execution, and command. And when a pitcher keeps the same stuff but suddenly slashes hard contact this aggressively, it usually means he has rediscovered the exact point where the entire arsenal starts working together again. Freddy Peralta has not fully returned to his 2025 form yet. But for the first time this season, the road back is finally starting to appear. View full article