There are, as there usually are, a million ways to autopsy the season after you come up short. But I think this year it was pretty obvious that the main shortfall as compared to expectations lies in just one place: with the supposed stalwarts who were supposed to shut down the end of games. What I'm trying to do here is put on number on that failure. While we can trash the logic of Brodie's biggest off-season move last winter, and specifically wonder whether he was guilty of 'buying high' on Diaz coming off such a stellar year that he was unlikely to repeat, or even the wisdom of importing 'proven' closers vs hoping one will turn up through trial and error, it's clear that what he provided wasn't even within the realm of reason. That goes for Familia as well even if not quite to the same degree. Neither is at age age [ED = 25 just as the season began, JF = 30 in a few weeks] where you could reliably predict downfalls, and while Familia missed a few weeks with an injury, Diaz, as far as we know anyway, was healthy all season long. So if we don't want to just assume the two could repeat 2018, how about asking them for merely the average of the past three seasons? For Diaz that means the average of his ML career to date prior to this season. For Familia it's the previous 2-1/2 as a Met plus his partial season in Oakland. If we take those average rates and compare them to what we could reasonably have expected vs what we got instead what we get is: - instead of a combined total of 74 ER allowed, we'd get exactly half, 37 - instead of 116 hits in 118 innings we had a right to expect more like 89 - those 22 HRs allowed become 8 - 64 walks are cut down to 45, while K's remain virtually the same [162 to 157] So that's an extra 37 runs allowed on 27 extra hits and 19 more walks THIRTY SEVEN EXTRA RUNS!!! Now normally the 'Pythagorean Wins' projection figures that it takes about 10 extra runs allowed/not scored to turn a win into a loss. So by that method alone we're talking 4 lost wins accountable to those extra 37 runs allowed, a figure that would have put us at 90 wins rather than 86. But I'd argue that runs at the end of a game, where the addition/subtraction of one or two can flip games around, can't be judged on the same scale as just random runs scored/not-scored across a season. Not quite sure how those runs can be weighted (even closers give up meaningless runs at times) but shirley the gap between the norm from those two and what we actually got cost more than just four wins. I mean, take away 37 runs from a combined 132 appearances and 118 innings [66 G each, 58 & 60 IP] and that's gotta mean, what ... Six?, Eight?, Ten?!? At that point we're into the 90s in wins and maybe up to the mid-90s and who knows how different things could have been.