roger_that

He'd managed some of them at Tidewater the year before, knew that they could play ball at the MLB level, wouldn't take "They need more time" for an answer. Valentine did this as well, to a lesser degree. Davey was a rare baseball genius, eight steps ahead of the rest of us. Won 98 games as a manager five different times, with four different clubs. How many others have done that? Joe McCarthy, maybe? I don't know. Not many. ETA: Looked up McCarthy's record. He won 98 or more nine times but only with two clubs, the Yankees and the Cubs. If you lower the bar to 96 wins, he did that with the Red Sox twice.

A righter guy there never was. Straight shooter, no-liar, his own guy on a squad of lunatics, champion manager and player, fired from more jobs on his own terms than anyone in history.

That's what they're paid for. Otherwise dorks on the CPF could do it for cheaper. Even for free.

I had it on very good authority here on the Cranepool Forum that he (and Baty) were hopeless and should be dealt for whatever used athletic equipment some stupid team would offer in trade.

Well, yeah, any time before they get eliminated from the playoffs--whether in July, August or mid-September--is BEFORE it costs them a playoff spot. But that's just excusing the inexcusable.

How about if that "need" for absolute positivity costs the team a playoff spot? Then it kind of looks like cowardice, a lack of judgment, dithering, weakness in the decision-making process, poor personnel evaluation, and general schmuckerie, don't it? These kids could be the best thing since Gooden, Darling, and Fernandez, or maybe since Seaver, Koosman, and Gentry. Imagine if they'd held them back so that Bruce Berenyi, Ed Lynch and Mike Torrez (or Al Jackson, Jack Hamilton, and Bob Hendley) could take their turns?

Again (and you're probably sick of hearing me repeat this point) this pattern of calling up rookies who succeed immediately ONLY when the MLB talent falters is a terrible indictment of the Mets' ability to recognize talent in their minor leaguers. If Senga needed to be sit down, put on the IL, stuck in the bullpen until he straightened himself out several weeks ago, but was kept in the rotation simply because they had no confidence in their talented AAA pitchers, that's on the front office, and I find it damning indeed.

How has Waddell avoided the nickname "Rube"?

This too shall pass

I think you're forgetting about the role played by the coach here. Oddly enough, on the Miami broadcast (I don't know about the NYC broadcast), there was a quick shot of Soto admiring his blast for a long second. Obviously what he could tell was that the ball was either going to go out of the park (which it very nearly did) or be caught by the LFer, who was positioned perfectly. The Mets' first base coach could see the same, of course, and he could have yelled to Lindor "Tag" (and then "Go") in that second, reducing the need for Lindor to make any of your complicated calculations. I'm not quarreling with you that the circumstances (fast runner, deep fly with OFer positioned perfectly, long throw) arise very often, or even that last night's play was especially poor judgment, but more generally, you almost never see an advance on a sac fly with a runner on first, no matter how promising the conditions. I can't remember the last time I saw it. And I continue to maintain that in some instances, like last night, the runner on first has a MUCH greater chance of success than attempting a stolen base. To me, it looked as if Lindor could have taken second base easily on Soto's fly ball. And BTW if we're going to play retrospective vision games, that particular advance turned out to be unnecessary since instead of hitting into the DP that my plan would have prevented, Alonso hit a HR that scored Lindor anyway.

Did you see the play last night I'm talking about? If you've got it on tape, as I do, it was the bottom of the 3rd, the Mets down 4-2, and Lindor led off the inning with a single. Soto lofted one out to LFer Troy Johnson, high in the air, and Johnson perched underneath it on the warning track. There was no way Johnson doesn't catch that ball easy, 999 times out of 1000. There was no "in case it drops"--maybe it would have gone out of the park if Johnson misjudged it badly but he was waiting underneath it from the get-go. My dumb question concerns these types of plays only. Obviously if the fielder is hustling ,and there's a real chance it drops, or if he has to catch on the run, you stay between first and second and hope he messes it up. Or if the runner isn't fast, no sense in tagging up. Or if the fielder has a notorious gun for an arm, or the ball isn't hit that deep. But none of those applied to last night's play. In fact, the Miami announcers had been commenting on how Soto and Alonso led the Mets with 16 and 20 GIDPs so a steal attempt wasn't a bad play here. And you know Lindor makes a successful steal 3 out of 4, or 4 out of 5, but certainly short of a sure thing. I have him at least 4 out of 5 to tag up successfully in that spot. (Remember, most clubs put their weakest outfield arm in LF, and the 2Bman must take the throw with his back to the runner.) If you've got it recorded, go back and see if you disagree on that play. If not, take my word that the situation is as I've described it.

I asked this in last night's IGT, and got no answers, understandable since it wasn't really part of the thread other than referring to something that happened during the game. It relates better to baseball strategies in general. Another thought this morning concerns speedy runners like Lindor attempting to steal bases, or to advance on pitches in the dirt, and other such risky plays on which a 75% success rate is considered good. But on this tag-up play, it seems a higher bar is set--80 or 90% or more before tagging up to 2B on a deep fly to the outfield is deemed worthy of the attempt. Anyway here's my dumb question: \

That's certainly one way to go. Can any club afford to do that (or something very similar) with their top-dozen good young players? Or do you want to pick your spots? Is it equally wise to do that with pitchers as with hitters? Is it an advantageous policy for both players and clubs? This one seems easy--it's a no-brainer for players, who get guaranteed more money than they've ever seen even if they break both legs tomorrow. But consider Tom Seaver, who got traded because he demanded a long-term guaranteed contract at top dollar, except the amount he was demanding turned out to be pretty piddling in retrospect because players' salaries kept breaking records and Seaver remained a good pitcher for years afterward. In other words (as I recall) Seaver was asking for the moon (in 1970s dollars) but it would have turned out pretty good for the Mets if he'd simply gotten the money he was asking for (in 1980s dollars). I could be misremembering here--correct me if you think I'm wrong--but the principle of "Be careful what you want because you just might get it" seems to be applicable. Still, it's hard to fault someone for being greedy and accepting an 8-year deal that makes him wealthy in advance of sustained MLB success.

So the opt out is basically the club's concession to the player "ok, we'll take the hit if you're still performing at a very high level in year X and if you suck eggs at that point, we'll keep paying you top dollar anyway"? Presumably, this is an incentive to sign the contract for less than the agent is asking for.

Aren't opt-outs a mere complication to an already-complex problem? They seem to present a way to mitigate or compromise the difference between a club's proposal and an agent's acceptance of that proposal. Are we suggesting that without an optout there is no ideal point at which to offer a young player a contract extending into his free-agent years? The key question to ask here is how prolifigate a club is, and how little wasting many millions of dollars matters to that club. But since we're talking about the Mets specifically, we can tailor the question to their finances, which seem to accept 'wasting millions of dollars" as the cost of doing business. I suppose the answer does depend a lot on the club offering the contract. With so many potential young stars on their roster, this issue should arise several times in the near future. The Mets can lock down the peaks of numerous young stars, so it will be interesting to see what their philosophy on this question is. High-risk? Moderate? I don't think they'll be playing it very safe, which is to let stars in their 20s enter free agency very often.

On the IL, I think. So where in McLean's career would you sign him to contract extending into his free-agency years? "Never" is certainly a respectable choice, one I might just take myself, especially with a pitcher. But is there no sweet spot where a good young player acquires a modicum of security and the club acquires his services for a reasonable cost?

It's the sophomore jinx really a thing? I don't mean "has anyone ever had a worse second season than his first season?" The answer to that is "of course"-- but players often have worse fifth seasons than their fourth season. All players fluctuate. No one ever has had a career of continually improving seasons or continually declining seasons. It's just more noticable when someone has had only two seasons And your example of someone with a declining second season, Vientos, isn't even certain yet. If he stays hot for the next month, there may not be any difference, other than his injury this year, to Mark where he's had a better 2024 than 2025. Should the Mets offer Vientos an eight year deal after this season if he stays hot?

It's curious how their stats are close at this point in the season but their WAR are far apart. Vientos has recently departed the negative WAR, and sits at 0.0 today, while Baty is at 2.4 WAR points, sixth on the team, ahead of Senga (2.3 WAR), Diaz (2.1), and McNeil (2.0). But compare Baty head-to-head with Vientos, and the WAR disparity seems a little weird. Baty listed first: BA .248/.246 OBP .309/.294 SLG.437/.429 OPS .746/ .723 An edge for Baty, sure, but a very small one. As far as playing time goes, Vientos has ten more PAs than Baty, 361/351. Walks and strikeouts, very similar. Baty 28/84, Vientos 21/83. Of course, Baty has shown defensive superiority, both in terms of fielding ability and versatility, but that can't account for a 2.4 WAR difference, can it? Maybe it's the combination of defensive ability and the small edge Baty has offensively? Still seems a bit weird to me.

...or Tong or whoever to a long-term contract buying out his Free Agency years? I'm using McLean as an example but really I'm talking about any successful player under contract at any point in his first six years. We're going through the late stages of this discussion with Alonso right now, and it's been a matter of some dispute whether the Mets should have offered him a lucrative contract towards the end (or middle?) of his first six years and whether he (meaning him and Boras) should have bit or passed on the deal. It's a philosophical question, and a financial one, all at once. For the Mets to offer McLean an eight-year deal right now, after three phenomenal starts, seems an absurd gamble on their part that he will continue to pitch as he has but a very good one for him to accept, if it were offered. I'm talking about a lot of money that they need not gamble with before they have more evidence of his superior pitching, so it's a silly discussion at this stage--but when do you think it slides into the "not silly" category? After a year of excellent pitching, when they have control of him for another five years? After three years of excellent pitching? By his fifth year, I think his agent will say, "No, we're close enough to free agency that I want to risk living with an arbitrated salary for another year and then test the FA market." So there's a sweet spot when both the club and the player are willing to gamble on a lucrative extension. My question is where do you think that sweet spot is? Answering "It differs for every player" is just evasive. Of course it differs for every player,and every agent, and every club, but I think you can generalize about a young player who performs very well, and your inclinations to offer that lucrative contract at a point when he's open to signing it. In fact, I think I'll make a poll out of this--it will help me to focus on what my answer is to this question.

Yes, everyone agrees that it's impossible to know, by definition: "knowing" requires access to an alternate universe. But it's certainly reasonabe to suspect that if a rookie has an impressive start to his career, he very likely could have been called up earlier and had that success. What we can "know" is that holding him back longer would have been needlessly timid. I maintain that there's a very thin line between AAA success and MLB success, and GMs are reluctant to test how thin that line is. BTW, I haven't heard much from the Baty-haters lately. I wonder why that is.

Yes, you are guessing it was me.

Rather than continuing to engage in a snarkfest with you, Edgy, over approximately nothing, I would be curious to know how far back the oldest posts on this forum go, if you've troubled to save them. If so, we could look at posts from summer 2003 on the subject of Reyes, how good the CPF thought he was, what was made of his callup, and so on. I have no idea where these old posts might be, if they exist, but maybe someone else (you?) knows. Might be interesting to review in general. Maybe my memory is off, and we were denouncing the Mets organization for their foolishness in calling up this raw minor leaguer and expecting him to perform at a major league level.

Okay, so while you're preparing your Himalayan mountain of evidence, why don't you read a bit from Reyes' Wikipedia entry? In fact, instead of trying to refute "Over the following weeks Reyes' impressive form continued" with your impressive mountain of evidence, why not correct the Wiki entry first? Can't allow ridiculous lies to spread, can we?

Can you, though? He was promoted in the middle of June, played a rangy shortstop while getting off to a slow start with the bat, but before July was over, he was batting in the .280s. His season was done at the end of August, by which point, 69 games in 2 and 1/2 months, he was playing a major league quality shortstop and batting .307. Despite playing fewer than 70 games, he had 2.3 WAR. I call that "evidence" of a rapid demonstration that he was an excellent player at the age of 20 even if you don't. I don't think there was a Mets fan in the world who said at any point there "Gosh, I wish they would have left him in the minors longer." And of course if you're being literal about my words 'first day' I'll remind you that he got two hits, one of them a double, and scored two runs in his first three at bats as a Met, which most of us took as a positive sign.

My point is not that Wright or Reyes or anyone was "unreasonably delayed." It's that they were MLB-ready the day they were called up and, unless the Mets are luckier than anyone could expect to be, they probably were ready somewhat before that day. You know, lots of young players have a rough first few weeks or months (I'm thinking of Strawberry in particular) but they adjust and after a while they begin to perform at a high level, even a ROTY-level (again, Strawberry). So it's certainly not true that every young player should have been called up sooner than they were. But with young players who show no sign of struggling at first, you have to wonder.